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Malaysia’s transitional moment?
Democratic transition theory and the problem
of Malaysian exceptionalism1
Jason P. Abbott
Abstract: Many theorists of democratization transition have, either
explicitly or implicitly, a teleological concept of political progress,
liberalization and reform. For such theorists, countries such as
Malaysia are therefore in transition towards substantive ‘full’ lib-
eral democracy. Taken in this light, the significant advances by
opposition political parties in the 2008 federal and state elections
in Malaysia represent a major advance towards this end goal. While
many have highlighted that Malaysia may in fact be an exception
to this rule, this paper contends instead that the Malaysian case
study challenges the central tenets of democratic transition more
profoundly. Indeed, since independence the Malaysian regime has
proved remarkably resilient and resistant to pressures for political
liberalization.
Keywords: democratization; development; discourse; teleology;
transition; Malaysia
Author details: The author is a Lecturer in International Politics and
Political Economy in the Department of Politics, University of Surrey,
Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH, UK. E-mail: J.abbott@surrey.ac.uk.
Many commentators and political scientists saw a unique democratic
moment for South East Asia in the aftermath of the Asian financial
crisis of 1997. The collapse of authoritarian rule by General Suharto in
Indonesia and the successful transition of the country to democracy
were seen as another pivotal moment in the successive ‘waves’ of
1 The author wishes to acknowledge and thank Professors Shaun Breslin (University
of Warwick) and Stephen Chan (SOAS) for their comments, as well as feedback
from faculty at the Department of Political Science at the University of Louisville,
Kentucky, where an earlier version of this paper was presented. In addition, he would
like to acknowledge the constructive comments of two anonymous reviewers.
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Table 1. Results of Malaysian parliamentary elections, 1999–2008.
Party 1999 2004 2008
Barisan Nasional 148 198 140
UMNO 72 109 79
MCA 28 31 15
MIC 7 9 3
Opposition 45 20 82
PKR* 5 1 31
PAS 27 7 23
DAP 10 12 28
Total seats 193 219 222
Source: Election Commission of Malaysia.
*Prior to 2004, PKN.
democratization that had been sweeping the world since the mid-1970s.
Demonstration effects seemed to abound, most notably with the adop-
tion of the cry of Reformasi by the protestors who flocked to the streets
of Kuala Lumpur in the autumn of 1998 to protest in support of the
former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim.2
However, in Malaysia the Reformasi movement was unable to pro-
duce either democratic transition or political reform and liberalization.
Anwar was detained under the draconian Internal Security Act and sub-
sequently sentenced for corruption. In the general election of 1999,
while the opposition coalition led by Anwar’s wife Wan Azizh achieved
some notable progress (Abbott, 2001), it failed to deny the ruling coa-
lition of parties its two-thirds majority. Subsequently beset by internal
divisions, the opposition would be comprehensively defeated five years
later in the general and state elections of 2004 (see Table 1).
Although Anwar was released from prison in September 2004, he
was legally barred from holding political office until April 2008. Con-
sequently, the Malaysian opposition was not to be catalysed by Anwar
again until the Barisan Nasional government called elections for March
2008. His legal bar notwithstanding, Anwar in due course became the
2 Anwar Ibrahim was sacked from his post as Deputy Prime Minister on 2 September
1998, dismissed from UMNO two days later and finally detained by police on 20
September. Detained under the provisions of the Internal Security Act, Anwar was
eventually convicted of both corruption and sodomy and sentenced to serve sen-
tences of six years and nine years concurrently. The charge of sodomy was overturned
by the federal court on 2 September 2004, and Anwar was released following a
reduction in his corruption sentence due to good behaviour. It is widely believed that
both charges were concocted as a result of divisions and recriminations between
then Prime Minister Mahathir and Anwar.
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de facto leader of a renewed Reformasi coalition, which once again
was formalized in a pact between the Islamic party PAS, the largely
Chinese Democratic Action Party and Anwar’s own party, Keadilan.
The results of Malaysia’s twelfth General Election took even the most
seasoned Malaysian political commentators by surprise. Although the
Barisan Nasional coalition headed by UMNO, which has ruled Malay-
sia since independence, retained its overall majority in parliament (see
Table 1), for only the second time in the country’s 51-year history, the
coalition lost its two-thirds majority.3 Furthermore, in parallel elec-
tions for the state governments, the opposition Peoples Pact [Pakatan
Rakyat] won control of five of the twelve states that held elections.4
Significantly, the opposition broke out of the heartland of the Islamic
party (PAS) in the north of Malaysia to win power in Malaysia’s two
most economically developed states, the island of Penang (where the
Chinese form a plurality of the population) and in Selangor (the state
that effectively surrounds the capital, Kuala Lumpur).
While retaining their majority, the victory was interpreted on all sides
as a symbolic defeat for the Barisan and a telling indictment of Prime
Minister Abdullah Badawi’s leadership. To add insult to injury, following
his formal requalification for political office, Anwar was unsurprisingly
returned to parliament on 26 August following victory in a parliamen-
tary by-election, whereupon he was sworn in as leader of the opposition.5
Buoyed by his by-election success, Anwar began a concerted public
campaign to persuade enough MPs within the ruling Barisan coalition
to defect to the opposition to achieve an end to its unbroken rule. De-
spite assurances that he had sufficient promises to achieve this goal,
his deadline for it passed uneventfully. Indeed, the only actual defec-
tions to occur have been in the opposite direction – from the opposition
to the government.6 Once again, it appears that Malaysia has resisted
the teleological wave of democratization.
3 The first time was in 1969, following which the country was racked by ethnic riots.
4




‘Anwar wins big in Malaysian by-election’, International Herald Tribune, 26 Au-
gust 2008, Website: http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/08/26/asia/malay.php.
6
‘Malaysian opposition shrugs off defections to ruling party’, 29 May 2008, AFP,
Website: http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5iWrOFSuTKbW1wpPt6gA8hi45-cPw;
and the Perak Constitutional Crisis triggered by the defection of two PKR assembly
men to UMNO and the decision by one DAP assembly woman to become an inde-
pendent in February 2009, ‘Dilemmas over defections’, The Star, Website: http://
thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2009/2/8/focus/3223040&sec=focus.
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Consequently, this paper posits that, rather than an exception to the
general pattern of democratic transition identified in the so-called
‘transitology’ literature, the Malaysian case study instead challenges
its central tenets. Indeed, contrary to the view that Malaysia is a regime
in transition towards ‘full’ democracy, the political regime in Malaysia
is not necessarily ‘going’ anywhere. In other words, the regime is rela-
tively embedded and has proved itself to be remarkably resilient and
resistant to pressures for political liberalization. This does not exclude
the possibility that at a future date the opposition might secure suffi-
cient votes to ensure a majority in parliament, but such an outcome is
by no means inevitable. Furthermore, the paper contributes to a grow-
ing critique of democratic transition theory that highlights significant
flaws in the construction of meta-narratives of societal and political
development.
Problematizing transition
From the so-called ‘Carnation Revolution’ in Portugal in 1974, which
brought down the military dictatorship that had ruled the country for
almost half a century, to the democratic transitions that swept aside a
swathe of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union, theorists of democratization have argued that the world has
witnessed a third and even a fourth wave of democratization (Huntington,
1993; Doorenspleet, 2005).
This seemingly irresistible teleological force has precipitated tran-
sitions worldwide, including in East Asia. Here, the pivotal moment
is generally regarded as being the overthrow of the Marcos regime in
the Philippines in 1985, which was followed respectively by an end
to the autocratic government of Chun Doo-Hwan in South Korea in
1992, the peaceful transition of power in Taiwan between 1987 and
2000, and an end in 1998 to the 32-year rule of General Suharto in
Indonesia.
The work of Samuel Huntington aside, there is a long tradition in the
social and political sciences that sees a causal relationship between
capitalist development and democratization, with a plethora of quanti-
tative and qualitative empirical research on the subject. For many of
these theorists, liberal democracy is both progressive and inevitable,
with the emerging middle classes identified as the agent of democrati-
zation (Lipset, 1959, 1960). As Robison and Goodman (1996, pp 1–2)
have argued,
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‘…the imagination of the West, and indeed, of the East as well, has
been captured by the dramatic emergence in East and South East
Asia of a new middle class and a new bourgeoisie . . . [t]hey are
increasingly regarded as the economic dynamisers of the twenty-
first century . . . [and] seen as embodying universal interests which
will create an Asia more like the liberal stereotype: more rational,
more individualistic, democratic, secular and concerned with human
rights, the environment and rule of law.’
One can argue that much of the literature on democratization echoes
the work of modernization theorists in the 1950s. Predominantly Ameri-
can political scientists, modernization theorists proposed that
democratization was a normative programme for the transformation of
societies from ‘backward’, rural, predominantly authoritarian socie-
ties into modern democratic ones (Almond and Coleman, 1960; Almond
and Powell, 1966; Rostow, 1960). Explicit in this viewpoint were both
an empirical relationship and a positive correlation between economic
development and political development. The more developed a society
was economically, the more democratic it would be politically. Fur-
thermore, open relations with the capitalist world economy would
stimulate both economic and political development, since capitalism
would encourage the growth of a domestic bourgeois elite that would
become the vehicle for modernization and the political transformation
of the state.
In the wake of the transitions to democracy in Latin America and
Eastern Europe, theorists of democratization proposed a more com-
plex relationship between capitalism and democratization in the
developing world (for example, Gunther, Diamandouros and Puhle, 1995;
Huntington, 1996; Leftwich, 1996; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Pastor, 1989;
Rueschemeyer and Stephens, 1992), but one that nevertheless reached
broadly similar conclusions. Again, capitalist development was regarded
as pivotal, since it shifted the balance of power in societies from au-
thoritarianism to social groups more inclined to democratic norms. As
Rueschemeyer and Stephens (1992, p 7) comment,
‘capitalist development is associated with democracy because it trans-
forms the class structure, strengthening the working and middle classes
and weakening the landed upper class. It was not the capitalist mar-
ket nor capitalists as the new dominant force, but rather the
contradictions of capitalism that advanced the cause of democracy.’
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Consequently, much of this work places emphasis on domestic class
relations, elite struggles and transnational class relations, while the
importance of civil society organizations and the impact of exogenous
factors, such as war, alliances and economic crises, are also highlighted
for their transformative potential.
Viewed through the lens of democratic transition theory, Malaysia
stands out as something of an incongruous exception – a regime that,
despite massive socioeconomic transformation, has made little progress
towards a fully functioning democracy.7 Indeed, most commentators
and observers of Malaysian politics would broadly agree that since
independence the country’s political regime has remained remarkably
resilient and resistant to change.
Economically, Malaysia has been one of South East Asia’s most dy-
namic countries. Widely lauded as a newly industrializing country, as
one of the second wave of Asian ‘tigers’, or in the typology of the
World Bank, a High Performing Asian Economy, between 1971 and
2007, Malaysia’s economic growth averaged over 7% per year. In ab-
solute terms, gross domestic product (GDP) at constant 1980 prices,
grew from Malaysian Ringitt 59.1 billion to 292.3 billion between 1980
and 2007.8 Consistent with that growth, per capita gross national prod-
uct (GNP) in current US dollars rose from $1,812 in 1980 to $5,756
over the same period.9 Consequently, the Malaysian middle class has
grown from less than a fifth of the population in 1970 to, by some
estimates, close to half of the current population10 (see, for example,
Loh Kok Wah, 2002, p 41). According to transition theory, the political
consequences of this growth should have been increased pressure for
political liberalization and democratization. Conversely however, dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s, at the height of Malaysia’s economic boom,
the country actually became less democratic (Jesudason, 1996, p 128;
Tan, 1990, pp 33–35). Under the premiership of Dr Mahathir Mohamad
7 While this paper does not debate how we define democracy, it nonetheless assumes
a conception of democracy that is importantly both procedural and substantive. Dahl’s
polyarchal definition of democracy (1998) is as good a definition as any. Such a
definition requires a strong degree of social capital and civic community. For a dis-
cussion of the importance of this in embedding democratic norms and values into
society as a whole, see, for example, the work of Puttnam (1993, 1995).
8 Figures courtesy of the IMF World Economic Outlook Database, Website: http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/01/data/index.htm.
9 Figures courtesy of the IMF World Economic Outlook Database, http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/01/data/index.htm.
10 Forty-six per cent by 2002.
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(1981–2003), the independence of the judiciary was curtailed, the powers
of the rotating monarchy weakened and internal democracy within the
ruling United Malays National Organization was also truncated (Case,
2002, p 110).
Another key feature of the transition literature is that socioeconomic
transformation should give rise to the growth of a vibrant and dynamic
civil society, which itself becomes a key advocate and agency for greater
democratization, as well as an important check on authoritarianism
(Bryant, 1993; Gill, 2000). Huntington and others argue that the emer-
gence of democratic reformers in civil society is important in creating
the possibility and opportunity for alliances to be constructed with
moderate elements within the ruling elite of authoritarian regimes. In
Malaysia, at first glance, civil society does appear to have grown con-
comitantly with economic growth, as transition theorists would expect
and predict.
As I noted in an earlier article (Abbott, 2001), economic growth in
Malaysia has resulted in the emergence of prominent civil society or-
ganizations, including the Consumer Association of Penang (1970),
the Environmental Protection Society of Malaysia (1974), Aliran –
human rights (1977); Sisters in Islam (1987), SUARAM – human rights
(1987), Tenaganita – women’s rights (1990), HAKKAM – human rights
(1991), JUST – political reform (1992); Charter 2000 – media reform
(2000); Bersih – electoral reform (2006); and Hindraf – Hindu rights
(2007).11 In addition, over the past five years there has been an explo-
sion of Internet activism and blogging in Malaysia, led in particular by
prominent civil rights activists, the most notable of which has been
Raja Petra Kamaruddin.12
In charting the growth of civil society in Malaysia, various incidents
and events have served as catalysts for more widespread coordination
and cooperation among the NGO community and with the wider civil
and political society. The arrest of Anwar Ibrahim in 1998 proved to be
the most notable in recent history, not least because from it would even-
tually emerge a new multiracial opposition party – Parti Keadilan Rakyat.
PKR began life as the Movement for Social Justice, or ADIL – an
11 HINDRAF was banned under the provisions of the Societies Act on 16 October
2008, ‘Malaysia bans ethnic Indian protest group’, 16 October 2008, Website: http:/
/www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/10/16/asia/AS-Malaysia-Indian-Group-Banned.php.
12
‘Malaysian cyber-paper at vanguard of media revolution’, 29 January 2009, Agence
France-Presse (AFP), Website: http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/articleALeq
M5jzFASb-fbqfZ6zs-GrPN55BSLXSA.
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umbrella organization launched by Anwar’s wife Wan Azizzah Ismail
to campaign for political, economic and social reform. What was note-
worthy about ADIL was that it brought together not only activists from
disparate political and class backgrounds, but also, and more impor-
tantly, societies and parties that represented the country’s different ethnic
and racial constituencies. Indeed, Weiss (2006) argues that the effec-
tiveness of this cooperation across the principal societal cleavages of
ethnicity and race was the result of what she terms coalitional capital –
that is, previous coalition building among NGOs had resulted in a process
that meant that ‘the groups involved were familiar with each others’
ideologies and goals, had established means of communicating and had
built up at least some degree of mutual trust and expectations of reci-
procity at the organizational level’ (Weiss, 2006, pp 16–17).
In April 1999, ADIL was transformed into a multi-ethnic political
party and renamed Keadilan [National Justice Party]. The party, which
would eventually merge with the smaller Parti Rakyat Malaysia to be-
come the PKR, attracted prominent NGO leaders to its ranks, including
Tien Chua (GAGASAN), and Irene Fernandez (Tenaganita) as well as
(briefly) Chandra Muzaffar. Explaining his decision to join party poli-
tics for a short period, Chandra remarked that the Anwar affair ‘made
it evident that NGO activity alone could not achieve the desired re-
sults. Instead there was a need for a more immediate challenge to the
abuse of power and the destruction of crucial institutions such as the
police and the judiciary.’13
Equally, in the run-up to the 2008 elections, civil society was again
energized as a result of the emergence of HINDRAF and the Bersih
rally on 10 November 2007. The Hindu Rights Action Force
(HINDRAF), itself a coalition of some 30 Hindu non-governmental
organizations, was founded to protest against a range of issues that
challenged the ethno-religious identity of the country’s Indian minor-
ity.14 Bersih was founded in 2005 as the Joint Action Committee for
Electoral Reform, and, like ADIL before it, is an umbrella organiza-
tion bringing together a range of disparate NGOs and the leading
opposition political parties. Such broad-based coalitions are signifi-
cant, with some commentators (for example, Stepan, 1988) contending
that forging horizontal relations across civil society is crucial if civil
13 Muzaffar, C. (1999), Interview with the author, 28 April, Kuala Lumpur.
14 These ranged from the wanton destruction of Hindu temples to prominent individual
cases of forced/fictitious conversion to Islam, and resulted in a mass demonstration
by HINDRAF on 25 November 2007.
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society is to become politically relevant and serve as an agent of de-
mocratization.
Nevertheless, for all the coalitional capital of Malaysian civil soci-
ety, and despite the galvanizing impact of catalysts that make ‘popular
grievances seem especially pressing or the chances for redress unusually
high’ (Weiss, 2006, p 3), Malaysia has not experienced significant
political liberalization, let alone democratic transition. In 1998, despite
the largest public protests since independence in 1957, the governing
coalition effectively decapitated the reform movement by arresting and
imprisoning its charismatic leader, the former Deputy Prime Minister
Anwar Ibrahim, along with other prominent civil society activists.
Furthermore, while the pro-reform coalition of opposition parties and
civil society groups was able to score some notable successes in the
general and state elections of 1999, the government nevertheless re-
tained its two-thirds majority and proceeded with ‘business as usual’.
Although it is still too early to judge what the longer-term impact of
the 2008 elections will be, as discussed below there continues to be, at
this juncture, little inevitability of liberalization or transition.
However important social and coalition capital may be to institu-
tionalizing new political norms and ‘making reform possible’ (Weiss,
2006, p 16), other transition theorists ague that, regardless of the strength
of civil society, the process of democratic transition requires a crisis of
legitimacy for the existing regime (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995, p 7;
Huntington, 1993). While such crises may result from the failure of the
government to deliver certain responses in specific areas, or from cul-
tural alienation, they are more often a result of economic crisis
precipitated or accompanied by the process of economic liberalization
(O’Donnell et al, 1986; Dogan and Higley, 1998).
Whether precipitated by liberalization or an economic crisis, implicit
or explicit bargains struck between political leaders and their key sup-
port groups can be adversely affected, signalling that the rules of the
game have changed (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995, p 7). In such cir-
cumstances, the breakdown of existing bargains encourages actors to
defect from the regime. As Haggard and Kaufman (1995, pp 7–8) argue,
‘…the inability [of the governing elite] to avoid or adjust success-
fully to economic crisis increases the probability that authoritarian
regimes will be transformed and reduces the capacity of authoritar-
ian leaders to control the process of political change, including the
terms on which they exist.’
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However, neither after the Asian financial crisis, nor following the March
2008 elections, was the Malaysian regime affected by wide-scale de-
fections from economic or political actors. Although clear differences
did emerge within the political elite over the best way of responding to
the Asian economic crisis of 1997–98, in part explaining the struggle
between then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and Anwar Ibrahim,
there was no widespread split within the governing Barisan Nasional
coalition or the dominant party within the coalition, the United Malays
National Organization (UMNO). Similarly, to date, despite fevered
speculation during the summer of 2008 of imminent defections to the
opposition, no-one has broken with the continuing hegemony of the
ruling Barisan coalition.15
For O’Donnell et al, among others, divisions within an authoritarian
regime are pivotal to democratic transition, a theme also explored at
length in Huntington’s work (1993). Huntington (pp 114–116) argues
that there are three effective kinds of transition: transformation [reforma],
replacement [ruptura] and transplacement [ruptforma]. The first and
third of these transition types are the result of important shifts in the
governing elite. In the first, the elites in power take the lead in bringing
about democratization, while in the latter the shift occurs when liberal
reformers and democratic reformers in a governing coalition align them-
selves with the democratic moderates among the opposition. The relative
power of reformers both in government and opposition will ultimately
shape the kind of transition that will occur.
In the case of Malaysia, the evidence from the past decade appears to
demonstrate that the democratic opposition is not strong enough or united
enough to bring about the overthrow of the regime (Huntington’s type 2,
ruptura), nor are reformers within the government strong enough or numer-
ous enough to bring about transformation [reforma] or to unite with the
opposition to create a transition via transplacement [ruptforma].
Indeed, one can go as far as to conclude that, despite all the factors
discussed, Malaysia may not be on a teleological trajectory towards a
fully functioning liberal electoral democracy. If this is the case, what
does it tell us about the nature of the Malaysian political regime?
The nature of the political regime in Malaysia
If we conceive of democratization as a teleological process, we would
15 Conversely, as noted earlier, the only defections that have occurred have been in the
other direction (see footnote 5).
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expect a regime such as Malaysia to have become progressively less
authoritarian. On the contrary, what is remarkable about the case of
Malaysia is the resilience of a regime that has been described by com-
mentators as a soft authoritarian state (Crouch, 1993; Means, 1996), a
semi-democracy (Case, 1993, 1997b), a state-led democracy (Jesudason,
1995, 1996) and as an example of electoral authoritarianism (Case,
2006).
Like Schedler (2002a), I prefer not to designate Malaysia as a de-
mocracy qualified by an adjectival descriptor (Collier and Levitsky,
1997), since such phrases carry the assumption that, while the country
may represent a limited or deficient form of democracy, it is nonethe-
less in transition. Instead, such regimes represent forms of
authoritarianism that ‘neither practice [sic] democracy nor resort regu-
larly to naked repression’ (Schedler, 2002a, p 36).
In this context, Malaysia represents precisely such a form of ‘elec-
toral’ authoritarianism and one that is specifically characterized by a
hegemonic party system. Since independence in 1957, Malaysia has
been governed by an intercommunal coalition,16 which has success-
fully managed the impact of socioeconomic transformation, as well
as a succession of economic and political crises. As in Hilley (2001),
the use of the word ‘hegemonic’ as a means of describing the nature
of the political system draws on a Gramscian understanding of hege-
mony, which emphasizes both the coercive apparatus available to the
leading class to ensure its dominance and the conscious attempt to
assimilate certain opposition ideas and policies in order to ‘pacify
ideological contestation’ (Worth, 2002, p 313).17 This strategy, termed
transformismo by Gramsci, enables the hegemonic coalition to co-opt
the more moderate of its opponents, thereby allowing it to marginalize
the more radical elements to the margins of politics where the use of
coercion becomes more legitimate (for example, see Weiss, 2006, p
38).
Malaysia’s ruling coalition, the Barisan Nasional [National Front],
employs an intercommunal governing model based on Malay–Muslim
dominance, but based on a much more extensive coalition than its
16 Prior to 1969, this coalition consisted of three political parties: UMNO, the MCA
and the MIC, and was known as the Alliance. Following race riots in that year, the
coalition was eventually reconstituted as a more inclusive intercommunal coalition,
the Barisan Nasional, which currently consists of 13 constituent parties.
17 Prior to 1969, the Chinese political party Gerakan was outside the coalition. Further-
more, between 1970 and 1978, the opposition Islamic party, PAS (Parti Islam
Se-Malaysia) was also part of the Barisan Nasional.
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predecessor, the Alliance.18 While the principal constituents of the BN
are the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian
Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC),
the BN comprises 14 political parties in total, including the leading
ethnic parties of the two East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak.
Since the ruling Barisan Nasional has routinely won over two-thirds
of the seats in parliament, it has regularly amended the constitution to
protect the regime. As one commentator succinctly observes, in Ma-
laysia ‘the constitution has become an apparatus of rule rather than a
constraint on power’ (Jesudason, 1995, p 338). This in part explains
the significance of denying the Barisan its two-thirds majority for the
first time since 1969. As a result of the 2008 election, the BN will now
no longer be able to amend the constitution or to mandate the results of
any future redistricting of constituency – another tactic that the gov-
ernment has used to preserve its hold on office.
Commentators and analysts of Malaysian politics have regularly cited
the coercive powers that the state is able to wield against opponents of
the regime. Among the principal legislative checks on internal opposi-
tion are the Internal Security Act, the Official Secrets Act, the Societies
Act and the University and University Colleges Act. Of all the means
by which the government is able to repress opposition, the Internal
Security Act attracts the most opprobrium. Originally passed in 1960
at the end of the communist-led insurgency (1948–60), the Act allows
police to arrest without warrant any person suspected of acting in ‘any
manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia … or the economic life
thereof and to detain them indefinitely without trial’. While its original
justification was to check internal subversion, in practice the Act has
been used against leaders of opposition parties and social interest groups.
Most recently, it was used to detain the prominent civil rights activist
and blogger, Raja Petra Kamaruddin,19 and five of the leaders of the
Hindraf protests in November 2007.
The Official Secrets Act gives the government the power to prosecute
any journalist who publishes official information without authoriza-
tion. The Societies Act requires every society to obtain government
18 The Alliance was a coalition of three parties, UMNO, the Malay Chinese Associa-
tion (MCA) and the Malay Indian Congress (MIC). The more extensive BN was
formed after the 1969 race riots.
19
‘Malaysia blogger’s arrest creates dangerous precedent’, The Guardian, 12 Septem-
ber 2008, Website: http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/blog/2008/sep/12/malaysia.
internet.
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permission for its establishment. It also created the Registrar of Socie-
ties, which is empowered to deregister any society on security or moral
grounds, or for deviating from its original goals. Finally, the Univer-
sity and University Colleges Act prevents students not only from joining
political organizations, but also from actively participating in political
protests.
However, despite such authoritarian aspects of the Malaysian politi-
cal system, executive power has been formally obtained through
nationwide general elections (12 since independence), there is univer-
sal suffrage for citizens, and opposition parties have the legal right to
exist and to be represented in parliament. Elections are therefore both
pluralistic and competitive, but rarely are the outcomes in doubt since
elections are instruments of authoritarian rule and a means by which
the governing coalition legitimizes its rule. However, a concomitant
quality of elections in Malaysia is that they also serve as a means by
which government can recalibrate and adjust policy in order to mini-
mize the impact of opposition. As Case (2006, p 96) argues,
‘Elections… [are] not intended to produce turnovers but instead to
provide feedback, registering fluctuations in support so that govern-
ments might adjust their policy course but never leave office.’
(Emphasis added)
Nonetheless, while Election Day may be fair, it is usually preceded by
a period of dubious electoral boundary delineation by a ‘quasi-’inde-
pendent Electoral Commission. Commentators on Malaysia’s political
regime have frequently noted the gerrymandering of constituencies to
favour Barisan Nasional incumbents and ‘malportionment’ (for exam-
ple, Case, 2006, pp 101–103). Traditionally, the latter resulted in rural
constituencies being disproportionately represented, since Malay–
Muslim populations were greater in rural districts. However, during
the 1980s, as support for the Pan-Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) grew
rapidly among this constituency, electoral boundaries were again shifted
to give greater weight to mixed-ethnic constituencies, since they largely
favoured Barisan Nasional parties.
In addition to the above inequitable distribution of seats during elec-
tions, tough restrictions are imposed on opposition rallies, which require
police permits if they are to be held in the open air. Furthermore, al-
though Malaysia is a developing country, albeit one of the more
economically dynamic ones, candidates for the federal parliament are
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required to provide one of the highest deposits in the world – RM10,000
– about $3,000 (Brown, 2008, p 741). In the UK, the comparable fig-
ure is £500, and in the USA it stands at $500 for the House of
Representatives and $1,000 for the Senate.
UMNO has also used its hold on state resources and the media, along
with its ability to deliver on-the-spot development grants and to ex-
ploit an extensive patronage system (see, for example, Case, 1996, p
117). Finally, as if such measures alone did not firmly ‘load the dice’ in
favour of the Barisan Nasional, election campaigns in Malaysia are
notoriously short in order to prevent the opposition from planning and
executing effective campaigns, especially given that they are required
to apply for police permits for outdoor rallies. In 2008, for example,
there were only 13 days between nomination day and the election, while
in 2004 there were only eight days.
The hegemonic party system as a ‘settled’ form of
government?
In light of the analysis of the nature of the political regime in Malaysia
and of the 2008 elections, what conclusions can we draw about the
impact of the case study on democratic transition theory? Is Malaysia
merely an exception to the general rule or are there fundamental prob-
lems with the theory itself?
In the case of Malaysia, there does not appear to be any causation
between the level of economic development and political liberaliza-
tion/democratization. As noted earlier, at the height of Malaysia’s
economic boom during the 1980s and 1990s, the country actually be-
came less democratic. Indeed, as Sarvanamuttu (2006) argues,
‘modernization and economic development provided the basis for a
performance legitimacy which… has sidetracked democratization’
(p 56).
This concept of performance legitimacy is important in explaining
the divergence between economic and political development. Since
independence, and especially under the Mahathir administration, one
of the principal legitimizing principles of the Malaysian regime has
been economic development. Much has been written on the economic
successes of the so-called East Asian Capitalist Developmental State,
but in the literature there is a broad consensus that these states ‘strove
to legitimate their rule through delivering economic success’ (Palan
and Abbott, 2000, p 87). In Malaysia, this performance legitimacy has
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been an important factor in explaining past election results (in particu-
lar the sweeping victories in 1986 and 1995).
Another interesting feature of the Malaysian case is that the middle
classes have not as yet proved to be the agents of democratic change
that we would expect. As Embong (2001, p 89) remarks in his compre-
hensive study of South East Asia’s middle classes,
‘[M]embers of the middle classes tend to be security-oriented and
have “short memories”. Being mainly a first generation middle class
without a very strong economic foundation, their agenda is to con-
solidate and enhance their economic position… thus their ideology
tends to be conservative, tending to support the status quo which
they perceive as having delivered the “economic goods” than for
change.’
In Malaysia, the middle classes have proved to be at best ambivalent
and at worst indifferent in their attitudes towards democracy. A recent
study by the Pew Global Attitudes Project of ‘Views on democracy,
religion, values, and life satisfaction in emerging nations’ found that
only 34% of the Malaysian middle class rated freedom of speech as
being ‘very important’, while only 35% rated freedom of the press as
‘very important’. When asked which of four specified freedoms was of
most importance to them, the one selected by the largest percentage of
the Malaysian middle class surveyed was ‘freedom from poverty and
violence’ (44%).20 Such views resonate with the conclusion of Loh
(2002), who has argued that, because the ‘new’ middle classes have
benefited disproportionately from Malaysia’s economic growth, rather
than become agents of change they are instead a materialist, self-cen-
tred group. In the Pew Survey, for example, when asked to place
themselves on a ‘ladder of life’, on which ‘0’ represents the worst pos-
sible life and ‘10’ the best, 52% of those in the Malaysian middle class
placed themselves on ‘rungs’ 7–10.
In Malaysia, this lack of reformist zeal is likely to be a result of two
related factors:
(1) The ethnic/racial segmentation of the middle classes militates
against a coherent, unified actor. Although both in 1999 and in
20 The other three freedoms in this section of the survey were being free to speak,
being free to practise religion and being free from hunger and poverty, Website:
http://pewglobal.org/commentary/pdf/1051.pdf.
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2008, interethnic coalitions were formed between the opposition
political parties, suggesting that there is a degree of the coali-
tional capital Weiss identifies within civil society, there continues
to be a noticeable lack of integration among the Malay and Chi-
nese middle classes. Interracial marriage is extremely rare,21 as
the non-Malay partner must convert to Islam since apostasy is
forbidden under Shariah law (see Abbott and Gregorios, 2009).22
Additionally, as Saravanamuttu notes, ‘ethnic factions of the middle
class [are] in competition with one another for educational, em-
ployment, promotion and business opportunities’ (ibid, p 52). The
ethnic Chinese in particular find it very difficult to organize col-
lectively, given the country’s history and the dominant role that
ethnicity has played and continues to play in its politics. This lack
of integration arguably results in mutually suspicious indigenous
communities (Abbott and Franks, 2007).23
(2) A sizeable segment of Malaysia’s middle classes is dependent on
the state, either directly for employment or indirectly for privi-
leged contracts, entitlement programmes, patronage and
rent-seeking opportunities. Much of this dependency is the result
of an affirmative action policy that has been at the centre of gov-
ernment policy since the launch of the New Economic Policy in
1971. The policy, which was designed to raise the ratio of Malay/
Bumiputera equity to 30% by 199024 from less than 3% at its launch,
resulted in a whole swathe of quotas and positive discrimination,
especially in higher education, and has effectively continued in
various different guises since 1990.25 While it has redressed the
‘lopsided occupational situation at the time of independence’
(Embong, 2001, p 106), resulting in Malaysian society becoming
21 For example, in the last census there were only 57,000 Chinese out of a total popula-
tion of 23.3 million who recorded their religion as Islam.
22 In post-independence Malaysia, the unequal relationship between Malay and non-
Malay cultures was enshrined in the Constitution. Article 3 specifies that Islam is
the religion of the country, while Article 152 specifies that Malay is the national
language.
23 Language is a particularly contentious issue. Most recently, in March 2009, police
used tear gas to break up a protest by Malay students against the teaching of science
and maths in English rather than in Bahasa Melayu, ‘Malaysian police fire tear gas
at language protest’, Website: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/03/07/
malaysian-police-fire-tear-gas-language-protest.html.
24 By 1990, Malay/Bumiputera equity had risen to approximately 19%.
25 First with the New Development Policy (1999–2001) and then in the National Vision
Policy (2001–10).
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more middle class as a whole (ibid), critics of the policy argue
that it has bred a culture of dependency on the state among the
Malay middle classes. In their 1995 study, Bell et al reached a
similar conclusion, arguing that, whereas in Europe and the USA
the experience of liberal capitalism was grounded in competitive
individualism and entrepreneurialism, in East Asia the depend-
ence on state-led development had created ‘a middle class
constantly anxious about instability and insecurity’ (Bell et al,
1995, p 13).26 Such conclusions seem to be upheld by the survey
results of the Pew Global Attitudes Survey mentioned above and
have been noted by Malaysia’s political elite. For example, in his
address to the 55th UMNO General Assembly in 2004, Prime Min-
ister Abdullah controversially criticized the NEP, urging Malays
to rid themselves of their ‘crutches’.27
Other explanations for the lack of support for political liberalization
among the middle classes have attributed it to cultural factors (for ex-
ample, Pye, 1985; Neher and Marlay, 1995; Bell et al, 1995), on the
basis that Asian culture stresses communitarian values over individual
needs and freedom, and consensus and harmony over conflict. Such
cultural arguments were themselves adopted by Mahathir and Lee Kwan
Yew in Singapore to argue that there was a distinct Asian form of de-
mocracy, and that liberal democracy as practised in the West was
culturally alien to East Asians (Christie and Roy, 2001, pp 31–32, 47).
Returning to civil society, while we have seen, as modernization
theorists would predict, an increase in associational life and non-govern-
mental organizations, this has had at best only a limited impact on
political life. The impact of Malaysia’s civil society is therefore some-
what more problematic.28 While the NGO sector is certainly ‘vibrant’
(especially online), many of the leading political NGOs continue to
26 Jones and Brown (1994), in their analysis of the middle class in Singapore, refer to
this behaviour as kiasu – ‘afraid to lose’. Weiss argues that, while more complex,
some of the same complacence is seen in Malaysia (2006, p 40).
27
‘Abdullah stirs a hornets’ nest’, 2 October 2004, AsiaTimes Online, http://
www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FJ02Ae05.html.
28 At this juncture, an important distinction should be made between civil and political
rights NGOs and NGOs that deal with a wider gamut of issues such as health, con-
sumer affairs, etc. While many of the former lack widespread membership, this is
not true of many of the latter. The National Council of Women’s Organizations has a
membership of more than a million, while the Malaysian AIDS Council has 42 af-
filiate partners. Other NGOs with large memberships include the People’s Service
Organization (with over 40 branches) and JIM.
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lack widespread membership,29 and remain reliant on external funding,
which leaves them critically vulnerable to attack from the government.30
Of particular note are the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the National
Endowment for Democracy, the International Republican Institute and
the Southeast Asian Press Alliance.31 Furthermore, many civil and political
rights-oriented NGOs draw a lot of their support from the non-Malay
population in a country in which ethnic divisions continue to provide the
strongest social cleavage. Although Malay NGOs have grown in number
over the past decades, and cross-ethnic coalitions of NGOs have been
formed to campaign for specific issues, there nonetheless remain few
truly multi-ethnic, intercommunal civil society organizations.32
The weaknesses of Malaysia’s civil and political rights-oriented NGOs
mean that for the most part they have limited connections with the
wider population, and are composed of pro-democracy elites that are
insufficiently embedded within society as a whole. Thus they rarely
actually represent or speak for a particular constituency. Ottaway (2003)
argues that, because of this situation, ‘the advocates of democracy …
remain by-and-large free-floating elites… in many cases they appear
to be much better embedded in an international milieu of democracy
advocates than in the societies they are trying to reform’ (p 181). Ottaway
goes on to argue that one of the resultant weaknesses is that such groups
tend to be more focused on the realization of political liberalization
than on attempting to influence government. Such goals, while impor-
tant, do not, she maintains, ‘help democratic organizations become
embedded’ (ibid).
29 Comment from Joseph Roy Benedict, Amnesty International, 27 January 2009.
30 Many NGO activists argue that there is little choice available to them but to seek
external funding, because there is very little support from the government. Further-
more, as one activist commented, ‘There is a process of selective funding whereby
government funds are given to preferred NGOs who support their policies, and are
essentially used as mobilizing tools and party supporters’.
31 It is alleged that the online newspaper Malaysiakini was set up with a $100,000
grant from SEPA, which in turn receives funding from the National Endowment for
Democracy (NED) and the US Department of State. In 2007, the NED provided the
IRI with $400,000, Suaram with $80,000 and SEPA with $100,000. Website: http://
www.ned.org/grants/07programs/grants-asia07.html#malaysia.
32 A small-scale Internet survey of NGO leaders/activists (April 2009) asked respond-
ents to evaluate according to a standard 5-point Likert scale the following statements:
(1) Many of the leading political NGOs continue to lack widespread membership;
(2) Many of them are reliant on external funding; (3) NGOs draw a lot of their
support from the non-Malay population; (4) Although Malay NGOs have grown in
number over the past decade, few are truly multi-ethnic organizations. While a clear
majority of respondents agreed with statements (1), (2) and (4), there was less clear
agreement about statement (3).
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In her recent work, Weiss (2006) challenges this view, arguing that
what is important is not so much the ‘depth’ and ‘vibrancy’ of social
capital, since that capital can also be particularistic and non-democratic,
as the extent to which civil society associations (CSAs) are able to
engage with each other and with opposition political parties to achieve
a degree of consensus on agenda, tactics and strategies towards shared
ends (it is this that she terms coalitional capital). In illiberal regimes,
Weiss maintains that opposition parties cannot act independently of
non-party activists, but nor can CSAs achieve political reforms on their
own. Instead, the former are potentially able to advance institutional
reforms while the latter have a long-term normative advantage. To il-
lustrate her point, Weiss argues that the Reformasi movement emerged
because there was an opportunity for reformers to take strategic advan-
tage of the crisis caused by the Asian financial crisis and the elite split
between Mahathir and Anwar, as well as for a common justice plat-
form around which communally divided CSAs could converge as a
result of coalitional capital that had been developed by earlier horizon-
tal networking (such as campaigns against the Internal Security Act).
For Weiss, the significance of the Reformasi movement was that it
aimed to ‘make voters think differently about politics … [and] make
them prefer different political norms’ (p 187). Thus, while political
NGOs may lack a wide membership, their size and funds are not what
is significant. Rather, the fact that they were able to coalesce around a
common platform reveals that they were able to overcome their short-
term interests. The fact that we saw a reconstitution of the Reformasi
coalition in 2007–08 should come as no surprise, therefore, since one
of the most important aspects of coalitional capital is its ‘long-term
iterative nature’ (ibid).
It is too early to tell whether the renewed Reformasi coalition that
coalesced around Anwar Ibrahim and the Pakatan Rakyat will prove
any more enduring than in 1998. On one level, the degree of formal-
ized cooperation between the constituent parties is already more
advanced and institutionalized than it was a decade earlier. On another,
the successes of the renewed coalition in the 2008 elections were greater
than those achieved in 1999. However, it is my contention that one
should be more pessimistic than optimistic.
First, in the aftermath of the original Reformasi movement, the com-
munal divisions between the Islamic party and the secular Chinese
Democratic Party ultimately proved too great for formalized coopera-
tion to be maintained. While a common platform between the parties
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has been formalized around the concept of a welfare state, any shift by
the Islamic party and its allies within civil society towards a more overtly
Islamic agenda, as in 2002, would strain these renewed ties. Second,
while Anwar Ibrahim has again played a pivotal and decisive role in
galvanizing support for the opposition, there is already growing dis-
content that he has focused too much on achieving power by encouraging
defections from the ruling coalition rather than with the delivery of
policy promises in those states where the opposition won control.33
Third, direct participation by former non-party activists and bloggers
in politics, which we are now seeing in Malaysia, seriously risks com-
promising the normative authority of Malaysian NGOs, especially when
they lack mass membership. Arguably, such direct participation vindi-
cates government charges that such organizations, rather than being
‘non-governmental’, are actually proxies for the opposition political
parties. Finally, the nature of the political regime in Malaysia, as de-
tailed earlier, makes the opposition extraordinarily vulnerable to
co-option (either directly or indirectly) by the government. Case (2006),
for example, argues that in both Singapore and Malaysia, governments
have successfully manipulated the political and electoral arenas to
recalibrate their regimes when confronted with opposition advances.
Between 1999 and 2004, the Barisan Nasional was able to recalibrate
successfully, resulting in a landslide victory. The test for the Najib ad-
ministration in Malaysia over the next few months and years will be
whether the Barisan and UMNO in particular can once again skilfully
recalibrate the political arena, or whether it will be unable to remedy
the decline in its fortunes in 2008.34
Concluding remarks
While varying factors can be postulated to account for the exception
that Malaysia poses to democratic transition theory, this paper con-
tends that the solution is not theoretical realignment. In other words,
Malaysia and similar cases do not necessarily require transitologists
simply to revise their theory, taking into account additional variables
that will make it more rigorous. Instead, this paper argues that the
33 For example, interviews with Dzulkefly Ahmad, PAS MP for Kuala Lumpur, Sep-
tember 2008; Yursi Mohamad, President of ABIM, September 2008; Haris Zalkapli,
blogger, PolitikPop, September 2008.
34 Case, for one, maintains that economic strains combined with the clumsy manipula-
tion of institutions and overtly repressive force can constitute the tipping point for
electoral authoritarian regimes (Case, 2006, p 111).
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Malaysian case study presents less an exception to democratic transi-
tion theory and more a critique of the teleology of transition.35
Malaysia is, in other words, not necessarily on a teleological trajec-
tory towards a fully functioning liberal democracy. Indeed, the contrary
seems to be the case as, since independence in 1957, the nature of the
political regime in Malaysia has been remarkably consistent. Carothers
made a similar observation in his 2002 critique of democratic transition
entitled ‘The end of the transition paradigm’. In the article, he argued
that few supposed transitional regimes had made much progress to-
wards becoming well functioning democracies. ‘By far the majority,’
he wrote, ‘… have not achieved relatively well-functioning democ-
racy [or] deepening or advancing [of] whatever democratic progress
they have made’ (2002, p 9). Instead, he argued, this ‘precarious mid-
dle ground … is actually the most common political condition today of
countries in the developing and the postcommunist world’ (ibid, p 18).
In other words, it is ‘not an exceptional category… but a state of nor-
mality, for better or for worse’ (ibid). In recent years, a growing literature
has emerged that has directly challenged the central tenets of transitology
(for example, Ottaway, 2003; Schedler, 2002, 2006).
In the case of Malaysia, by describing the country’s political system
as a semi-democracy, a state-led democracy or a quasi-democracy, we
are accepting, at least implicitly, that the process of transition is inevi-
table and that the country is somewhere along the path to transition.
Schedler argues that attaching such adjectives to democracy is tanta-
mount to ‘conceptual stretching’. He strongly maintains that it makes
no sense to classify regimes that fundamentally violate democratic norms
as democracies, however we may choose to qualify the noun (2002a).
Schedler goes further, developing a metaphorical chain of seven demo-
cratic preconditions, the violation of any one of which renders a regime
undemocratic. His principal justification for adopting this heuristic device
is to reduce the opacity of the ‘grey zone’ and more importantly to
treat democratic regimes as ‘bounded wholes’ (ibid, p 41).
Ottaway, in her 2003 study, echoes Carothers’s and Schedler’s con-
cerns, arguing that the grey zone, rather than representing a messy middle
along the road to transition, has increasingly become characterized by
regimes that are deliberately ambivalent in their attitude towards demo-
cratic norms. Such regimes, she argues, ‘are not imperfect democracies
35 The author acknowledges the comments of an anonymous referee for suggesting
that this should be couched in these terms.
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struggling toward improvement and consolidation but regimes deter-
mined to maintain the appearance of democracy without exposing
themselves to the political risks that free competition entails’ (p 3).
Viewed in this light, then, Malaysia’s hegemonic party system has
proved to be remarkably resilient and resistant to change. For over 50
years, this regime type has withstood dramatic socioeconomic trans-
formation brought about by Malaysia’s economic development, and
has coped with the ethnic unrest that culminated in the 1969 race riots,
the oil crises of the 1970s, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 (which
brought down the Suharto regime in neighbouring Indonesia and radi-
cally changed the make-up of Thai politics) and the gradual Islamization
of Malaysian society (see Abbott and Gregorios, 2009).
Ultimately, the Malaysian case study demonstrates that political
progress has not developed and does not necessarily develop ‘natu-
rally’ via the teleological progression of history. Instead, it emerges
both incrementally and partially as a result of specific localized re-
sponses determined by historical conditions and societal struggles.
Indeed, the danger in looking for generalized theoretical accounts of
social and political transformation is that they too readily become de-
terministic ‘meta-narratives’, which tend to de-emphasize the historically
specific nature of state–society relations, class structures, political sys-
tems, political leaderships and so forth. Such a challenge therefore
operates not only at the empirical level, but also, and perhaps even
more critically, at the ontological and epistemological levels relating
to the norms of positivist political science.36
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